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FROM RENAISSANCE POLAND TO
POLAND'S RENAISSANCE
Daniel H. Cole*
THE

STRUGGLE FOR CONSTITUTIONALISM IN POLAND.

By Mark

Brzezinski. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1998. Pp. 276. $49.95.
INTRODUCTION

Poland is located in Eastern Europe - the "other Europe"1 which shares a continent, but seemingly little else, with Western

Europe. Most histories of Europe, legal histories included, are actually histories of Western Europe only.2 The "euro-centrism"
some scholars complain about is, more accurately, a "western eurocentrism." The eastern half of the continent is ignored like the em-

barrassing black sheep of the European family.
Economic historians have described Eastern Europe as a "backward" place, where feudal and mercantilist economies persisted as
Western European economies modernized and industrialized. 3 In
geopolitical terms, Eastern Europe has been characterized as a region of "underdevelopment and dependence," "striving after the
'modernity' seemingly embodied in certain of its western
neighbours."'4 In the popular imagination Eastern Europe is "the
old country" - a region populated by poorly educated and xenophobic peasants, ruled first by nationalist despots and later by
communists.
The communists are gone now, and the countries of Eastern
Europe supposedly are "learning" about constitutional democracy.
American and West-European "experts" flocked there after the fall
of the Berlin Wall (with mostly good intentions) to teach the na* M. Dale Palmer Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law at Indianapolis.
A.B. 1980, Occidental; A.M. 1981, University of Chicago; J.D. 1986, Lewis & Clark; J.S.M.
1991, Stanford. -Ed.
1. See CHRISTOPHER ENGHOLM, THE OTHER EUROPE (1996); JACQUES RUPNIK, THE
OTHER EUROPE (1988); E. GARRISON WALTERS, THE OTHER EUROPE: EASTERN EUROPE
TO 1945 (1988).
2. A notable exception is Norman Davies's magnificent book, EUROPE: A HISTORY
(1996), which pays equal attention to Eastern Europe's contributions to European history.
3. See THE ORIGINS OF BACKWARDNESS IN EASTERN EUROPE (Daniel Chirot ed., 1989);
see also DAVID S. LANDES, Tr WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS 251-53 (1998) (describing Eastern Europe as "another world").
4. ROBIN OKEY, EASTERN EUROPE 1740-1985: FEUDALISM TO COMMUNISM 9 (2d ed.

1986).
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tives about democracy and constitutionalism.5 In many cases, these

teachers were as ignorant of local culture and history as they were
condescending. As German constitutional law Professor Hans
Mengel has stated, however, "[y]ou cannot come in and prescribe a
constitution.... It comes out of the cultural background. You have
'6
to take care of what the society is like in the moment."

Even internationally renowned legal scholars, such as Richard
Posner and Cass Sunstein, have felt obliged to give advice on reforming legal systems to countries about whose histories and cultures they admittedly know little.7 Judge Posner has urged the
"newly liberated" countries of Central and Eastern Europe to focus

on those "universal negative" rights which are relatively inexpen-

sively enforced, such as the right to property.8 Other rights, includ-

ing some "negative" rights that are taken for granted in relatively
wealthy democracies, such as rights that protect against the wrongful incarceration of innocents, should be disregarded (or only minimally protected) until they can be better afforded. 9 Imagine the
reception this kind of economism about the rights of criminal defendants would likely receive in a country like Poland, where
habeas corpus protections were provided for more than half a mil5. See, e.g., Charles-Edward Anderson, Exporting Democracy: U.S. Lawyers Help Eastern Europe Draft New Constitutions,A.B.A. J., June 1990, at 18; Clara Germani, Constitutional Experts in Demand, THE CmUsTAN SCIENCE MoNrrOR, Jan. 14, 1992; John H.
Kennedy, A New US Export ConstitutionalAdvice to Eastern Europe, BosToN GLOBE, May
31, 1990, at 12; Henry J. Reske, U.S. Constitution Unpopular: Eastern European Countries
Prefer Detail of Neighbor Democracies' Documents, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1991, at 28; Nancy E.
Roman, Democracy Gets U.S. Legal Aid. Lawyers Help Eastern Europe Emerge From Communist Haze, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, at Al; Herman Schwartz, Shaping the New Eastern Europe, LEGAL Tnams, Feb. 10, 1992, at 19; Susanne Sternthal, Lawyers Live the Spirit of
'87 Revolution in E. Europe, WASH. Tmams, July 4, 1991, at El; Lis Wiehl, Constitution, Anyone? A New Cottage Industry, N.Y. Tnmms, Feb. 2, 1990, at B6.
6. Jonathan Kaufman, The Collective Good As They Write Their Constitutions, Eastern
Europeansare Reaching Beyond the Rights of the Individual Hoping to Guaranteea Sense of
Community and Shared Value, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7,1991 (Magazine), at 22. To his credit,
the American constitutional law scholar Herman Schwartz has recognized this problem. See
Schwartz, supra note 5 ("Americans ... usually don't even know the language; many of us
can barely find these countries on a map; and we certainly don't know their legal systems.").
7. See Richard A. Posner, The Costs of Rights: Implications for Central and Eastern
Europe - andfor the United States, 32 TULSA L.J. 1 (1996); Cass Sunstein, Against Positive
Rights: Why Social and Economic Rights Don't Belong in the New Constitutions, 2 E. EUR.
CONST. REv. 35 (1993). Interestingly, Posner asserts that "a nation's political and legal culture affects the extent to which rights are enforced. But, as no one seems to know how to
alter a culture, there is not much to be gained from dwelling on the point." Posner, supra, at
18. This may be true, but it hardly excuses Posner's failure to consider existing cultural, historical, and institutional influences over the treatment of rights.
One of the "costs of rights" that Posner's article does not examine is the cost of hiring
American constitutional consultants to determine which rights to constitutionalize. According to published reports, Rutgers University Law School Professor Albert P. Blaustein, for
example, charged "more than $1,500 a day" for his advice to Poland. See Sternthal, supra
note 5.
8. See Posner, supra note 7, at 5, 8,10, 18.
9. See id. at 13-15.
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lennium before the imposition of communism, 10 and where in 1981
as many as 580 of every 100,000 Polish citizens were imprisoned (as
compared with 212 per 100,000 in the U.S. and 25 per 100,000 in the
Netherlands),"
many of them for no reason other than political
12
dissent.
Professor Sunstein agrees with Judge Posner about the dangers
posed by the adoption of costly "positive" rights in Central and
East European constitutions. He considers the combination of "[a]
chaotic catalogue of abstractions from the social welfare state" with
"traditional rights to religious liberty, free speech, and so on" to be
"a large mistake, possibly a disaster."'1 3 Sunstein is particularly concerned that socioeconomic constitutional rights - such as the right
to free medical care and the right to a clean environment - are
notoriously difficult to enforce; their lack of enforceability could
have a demoralizing effect on society, which could jeopardize the
perceived legitimacy of a constitution in toto. Consequently, he has
counseled Central and East European countries to set their constitutional sights on providing "(a) firm liberal rights - free speech,
voting rights, protection against abuse of the criminal justice system, religious liberty, barriers to invidious discrimination, property
and contract rights; and (b) the preconditions for some kind of market economy." One does not have to disagree with the merits of
Sunstein's prescription, however, to recognize that it had little or no
chance of being followed for reasons that have to do with history,4
culture, and existing institutions, all of which his analysis neglects.'
A common constitutional prescription would be unlikely (to say
the least) to work for all the countries of Central and Eastern
Europe. These are not homogeneous societies sharing common histories, cultures, institutions, and values. To the contrary, they are
extremely diverse. And it has always been a foregone conclusion
that each country would adopt a constitution reflecting its own history, culture, and values, and not necessarily those of western
advisers.
10. See infra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
11. See POLAND: A COUNTRY STUDY 289 (Glenn E. Curtis ed., 1994).
12. See generally THE LAWYERS COMM1TE FOR HUMAN RirHTs, REPRESSION Dis.
HUMAN RIGHTS IN POLAND (1987).

GUISED AS LAW:

13. See Sunstein, supra note 7, at 35.
14. Id. at 35-36. Interestingly, one of Sunstein's arguments against the inclusion of positive rights in constitutions is that "[c]onstitutions can be understood as precommitment strategies, in which nations use a founding document to protect against the most common problems
in their usual political processes." Id. at 36. Existing cultural, historical, and institutional
influences, however, can be understood as creating preconstitutionalprecommitment strategies, which can variously determine the contents of the constitutional precommitment strategies. No constitution has ever been written on a blank slate. See infra note 17 and
accompanying text.
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Moreover, not one of the postcommunist countries was "starting
from scratch" in constitution writing, as U.S. Supreme Court
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor asserted in a 1995 speech. 15 Constitutions, like other institutions, are not composed on blank slates but
are shaped by existing social, historical, intellectual, and institutional forces. As the economist Lee Alston has explained:
Institutions are historically specific, and for this reason it is necessary
to be sensitive to historical context. This is particularly true for the
dynamics of institutional change. Much of the developmental path of
societies is conditioned by their past. Even after revolutions, institution builders do not start off in a historical vacuum. At any moment
in time, actions are constrained by customs, norms, religious beliefs,
and many other inherited institutions. This is as true for the leaders
in Eastern Europe today as it was for Augustus Caesar. 16
Fortunately, some Central and East European countries have endogenous histories of democratic constitutionalism on which to
build.
Consider Poland, the first country to cast off communism, and
among the last to enact a wholly new constitution. 17 Unbeknownst
to most recent would-be advisers, Poland was the second country in
the world, and the first in Europe, to adopt a written constitution.' 8
Not only did Poles enjoy protection against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment almost 250 years before the English supposedly "invented" habeas corpus, but they elected their Kings by a politically
dominant parliament (the Sejm) while the rest of Europe still suffered absolute monarchs. Consider Poland in light of Mark
Brzezinski's' 9 new book, The Struggle for Constitutionalism in
Poland, which tells the story of how each time the Polish people
have been left to their own devices - i.e., between invasions by
Germans, Austro-Hungarians, Swedes, and Russians - they have
established increasingly democratic institutions and protected civil
liberties.
...

15. See Mack Reed, Justice Urges Courts to Set Example Abroad; Judiciary: O'Connor,at
Reagan Library, Says System Ought to be Model for Emerging Democracies, L.A. Tuvms
(Ventura County Edition) Aug. 30, 1995, at B1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws
File.

16. Lee J. Alston, EmpiricalWork in InstitutionalEconomics: An Overview, in ErmmI25, 25 (LJ. Alston et al. eds., 1996) (footnote
omitted).
CAL STUDiEs IN INsTrrurTioNAL CHANGE

17. On the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, see generally TmoT-nz GARTON ASH,
THE MAGIC LANTmR: THE REVOLUTnoN or '89 WITNESSED IN WARSAW, ButAPTm-r, BERLIN, AND PRAGUE (1990). Most of the former communist countries adopted wholly new constitutions between 1991 and 1993. See RErr R. LUDwIKosi, CoNSTITUTION-MAKING INTHE
REGION OF FORMER SoviET DOMINANCE (1996).

18. Mark Brzezinski & Leszck Garlicki, Polish ConstitutionalLaw, in LEGAL REFORM IN
PosT-COMMtrIST EURoPE 21, 21 (Stanislaw Frankowski & Paul B. Stephen eds., 1995).

19. Attorney, Hogan & Hartson, Wash., D.C. Brzezinski holds his law degree from the
University of Virginia and a doctorate in political science from Oxford.
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What follows is a review of Brzezinski's book, an assessment of
its contribution to a better understanding of the historically and culturally contingent nature of the constitution-making process, and an
appraisal of its contribution to a less western euro-centric understanding of legal history. Not only is Poland's history of constitutionalism western in its orientation, but P olish legal and
constitutional innovations, particularly those regarding civil and
religious liberties, predate similar developments in West European
countries. Indeed, during the Renaissance and Reformation eras,
Poland's protodemocratic and libertarian legal and political theories and practices significantly influenced efforts to reform absolutist monarchies in Western Europe. And they continue to influence
constitutional developments in postcommunist Poland.
In conformity to Brzezinski's book, this Review proceeds chronologically, beginning with the unwritten Constitution of Renaissance Poland and concluding with a brief glance at Poland's new
postcommunist Constitution, adopted in 1997. Along the way, we
will learn several things: first, Poland has had a long, sometimes
glorious and sometimes tragic, history of constitutionalism; second,
Polish constitutionalism has always been decidedly western in its
orientation; third, Poland has been -

and continues to be -

quite

innovative in its constitutional theories and practices, especially in
the area of civil liberties; and, finally, Polish constitutionalism has at
times been influential in Western Europe. Thus, Polish constitutional history challenges the western euro-centrism of most legal
historians, as well as the conventional wisdom of western lawyers
that postcommunist countries are, in Justice O'Connor's terms,
"starting . . . from scratch" in designing constitutional
governments. 20
BRZEZINSKI'S ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:

CONSTnTUTrONS AND CONSTITMrIONALISM
Brzezinski's historical analysis of constitutionalism in Poland is
prefaced with an "analytical framework" for assessing constitutionalism, which he rightly suggests to be inextricably intertwined with
democracy and limited government. He discusses (pp. 7-9) definitions of the term "constitution" from Aristotle, Giovanni Satori,
Carl Friedrich, and Karl Loewenstein, in order to distinguish constitutions that are so many words on paper (such as Stalinist constitutions) from those that have real normative effect - those whose
"written guarantees are actual practices, enforced over political authorities" (p. 10). Brzezinski adopts Bonime-Blanc's list of characteristics denoting "real," "normative" constitutions: constitutional
20. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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institutions exist and function as prescribed; constitutional rules

governing political practice are "consistently observed"; constitutional norms, including civil rights and liberties, are enforced
against violators; and government power is limited in practice by
constitutional institutions such as the separation of powers, checks
21
and balances, and judicial review.
Having asserted that only democratic governments are constitutional in practice, Brzezinski hastens to add that democracies need
not have written constitutions in order to be constitutional (pp. 1012). The prime example here, of course, is England. 22 At the same
time, the existence of a formal, written constitution is no sure sign
of constitutionalism, as proven by the former communist regimes in
Central and Eastern Europe. Those regimes enacted constitutions
that, on paper, were hardly distinguishable from those of western
democracies; in some respects, they looked even better. They were
not, however, worth the paper they were printed on.23 The communist countries of Europe may have had constitutions, but their political systems were not constitutional. This point is critical for
understanding Poland's history of constitutionalism. Without
Brzezinski's distinction between constitutions and constitutional
systems, there would be no formal basis for differentiating Poland's
communist Constitution of 1952 from other Polish constitutional
documents.
Tirn

CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY IN RENAISSANCE POLAND 2 4

Brzezinski appropriately begins his constitutional history of
Poland half a millennium before Poland adopted its first written
Constitution in 1791. During the thirteenth century, the Poles began developing institutions to limit arbitrary government. By the
sixteenth century those institutions had coalesced into a constitutional system, albeit one based on several fundamental laws rather
than a single written constitution. Brzezinski devotes only a few
pages to this period, which is unfortunate because, as we shall see,
in many respects it was the most remarkable period of Poland's
legal and constitutional development. It also provides an important
21. See ANDREA BoNmm-BLANc, SPAIN's TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY: THE PoLnmcs
OF CONSTrUTION-MAKING 11-12 (1987).

22. As the great American constitutional scholar, Thomas Cooley, wrote at the end of the

nineteenth century, "[a] constitution may be written or unwritten. If unwritten, there may
still be laws or authoritative documents which declare some of its important principles."
THOMAS M. COOLEY, TiE GEERAI. Pnci'LEs OF CONSTTTIONAL LAW IN THE UNrrED

STATES OF AMERiCA 22 (A.C. McLaughlin ed., 1898).

23. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
24. Much of the supplementary historical information provided in this Review is adapted
from Daniel H. Cole, Poland's 1997 Constitution in Its Historical Context, 1998 ST. Louis WARSAW TRANSATLANTIC L.J. (forthcoming).
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historical context for assessing subsequent constitutional
developments.
Brzezinski too briefly canvasses the fundamental legal and political institutions that constituted Poland's First Republic, but he
points out several of the central features of Poland's constitutional
system. First, it was a federal system, with regional parliaments
(sejmiki) that elected representatives to the national Diet (Sejm).2
These parliamentary bodies were the political arms of Poland's sizeable nobility (szlachta), which constituted between 7 and 14 percent
of the country's total population (numbering 7.5 million at its greatest).26 Because only members of the nobility could serve in the regional sejmiki or the national Sejm, parliamentary policies tended
to reflect the szlachta's interests. And the szlachta were primarily
interested in protecting their own liberties against the distrusted
Crown.27
Like England, sixteenth-century Poland was a parliamentary
monarchy. Unlike in England, however, the lion's share of power
in Poland was held by the national and regional parliaments; the
King was decidedly subordinate. His authority was increasingly circumscribed by a series of "privileges" exacted by the Sejm beginning in the fourteenth century. First, in 1374 King Louis of Anjou
granted the Privilege of Kogice, promising not to impose new taxes
without nobility's consent. In 1422, Louis's successor, King Jagiello,
promised not to confiscate the property of any member of the
szlachta without a court order. Eleven years later, he granted the
25. The regional sejmiki played a dominant role in this federal system. They deputized
representatives to the national Sejm, but did not give them plenipotentiary powers; rather,
deputies were required to follow detailed instructions. Upon their return from the biennial
six-week meeting of the Sejm, deputies were required to report to their sejmiki on all deliberations and actions taken in Warsaw. If it turned out that a deputy deviated from their instructions, the sejmik would often refuse to implement the national Sejm's enactments.
"Thus ultimate political control remained at the local level." Robert I. Frost, "Liberty without License?" The Failure of Polish Democratic Thought in the Seventeenth Century, in PoLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT FROM THE RENAISSANCE TO THE GREAT EMIGRATION:
EssAYs AND DocUMENTs 29, 48 (M.B. Biskupski & James S.Pula eds., 1990).
26. Brzezinski asserts, p. 34, that the nobility constituted "over 10 percent" of Poland's
population. Other estimates run from as low as 7 to as high as 14 percent. Cf 1 NORMAN
DAVIES, GOD'S PLAYGROUND: A HISTORY OF POLAND 215 (1982) (estimating that the no-

bility comprised approximately 7 percent of Poland's total population in 1569 and 9 percent
by the late seventeenth century); Wenceslas J. Wagner, Introduction to PotasH LAW
THROUGHOUT THE AGES: 1000 YEARS OF LEGAL THOUGHT IN POLAND 5 (W.J. Wagner ed.,
1970) (estimating that the nobility comprised between 10 and 14 percent of the total

population).
27. It is also important to recognize that, unlike in other European countries, there was
no legal hierarchy among Poland's nobility; impoverished "petty nobles" had the same quantum of legal rights as the wealthiest "magnates," including equal rights to vote in the National Assembly. As Field-Marshal Count von Moltke wrote, "[n]o Polish noble was the
vassal of a superior lord.... [T]he meanest of them appeared at the diet in the full enjoyment
of that power which belonged to all without distinction." FIELD-MARSHAL COUNT VON
MOLTKE, POLAND 3 (E.S. Buchheim trans., 1885).
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Privilege of Jedlna (Brzezinski refers to it as the Privilege of Krak6w (p. 33)), which proclaimed, "Neminem captivabimus nisi lure
victum - we will not imprison anyone except if convicted by
law."' 2 As Brzezinski notes (p. 33), this was a revolutionary innovation in civil libertarianism, providing a sizeable percentage of the
Polish population with due process-style rights two-and-a-half centuries before England enacted its first Habeas Corpus Act in 1679.29
Additional Crown concessions at the beginning of the sixteenth
century decisively shifted the balance of power in Poland in favor of
the nobility and their political arm, the Sejm. In 1501 the Sejm
firmly established its supremacy by exacting from King Aleksander
the power of legislative initiative. This led directly to the adoption
in 1505 of the nihil novi "constitution," 30 which prohibited the King
from enacting new laws without the Sejm's concurrence. Subsequently, after the death of the last Jagiellonian King, Zygmunt
August, in 1572, Poland's nobles completely abolished hereditary
monarchy. All subsequent Kings were elected by unanimous vote
of all the nobles. Brzezinski points out that "[t]his procedure precluded the King from possessing any notion of 'divine right' or
royal privilege and initiated the principle that the national sovereignty belongs to the whole nation, not to one individual" (p. 36).
Newly elected kings, prior to coronation, were obliged to swear
oaths of allegiance to all previously enacted laws; the principle of
religious toleration; the convention of an elected monarchy; the
privileges of the nobility; the right of the Sejm to convene regularly
and oversee the crown's policies; the nobility's right to approve declarations of war, foreign treaties, and new taxes; and, finally, the
nobility's right of resistance should the King fail to keep his word.
These oaths were codified in the first Pacta Conventa, the Acta
Henricianaof 1574.31

So, by the sixteenth century the Sejm and its constituency, the
nobility, were clearly established as the dominant political forces in
28. Quoted in Wenceslas J. Wagner, Justicefor All: Polish Democracy in the Renaissance
Period in HistoricalPerspective, in THE POLISH RENAISSANCE IN ITS EUROPEAN CoNTEXT
127, 133 (Samuel Fiszman ed., 1988).

29. The fact that the Privilege of Jedlna extended only to Poland's nobility made it no less
revolutionary; in fact, Poland's law provided broader coverage than many subsequently en-

acted habeas corpus statutes because Poland's nobility constituted a relatively large percentage of the total population. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting
that social classifications in Poland were not immutable; burghers and Jews were occasionally

ennobled. See J6zef Siemiefiski, PolishPolitical Culture in the 16th Century, in Tim POLISH
PARLAMENT AT THE SUMMIT OF ITs DEVELOPMENT (16TH - 17TH CENTURIES) 53, 60 (W.
Czaplitiski ed., 1985). During the sixteenth century, the Privilege of Jedina protected the
liberty of between five hundred thousand and a million Poles. The privilege was extended to
townsmen in the 1791 Constitution.
30. This document is reprinted in POLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHr, supra note 25, at 109.
31. Pp. 36-37. The Acta Henriciana(Pacta Conventa) is reprinted in English translation
in POLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 25, at 137.
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Poland. And the nobility exercised its power defensively - to protect its liberties. This is most evident in the ancient and infamous
mechanism of the liberum veto, which established a rule of unanimity for parliamentary decisions. A single legislator could prevent
the 236-member Sejm from taking action merely by saying "nie
pozwalam" ("I do not allow it"). The philosophical basis of this
right became the szlachta's credo: "Nierzqdem Polska stoi" ("It is
32
by unrule that Poland stands").

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the shift of
power from Crown to Sejm resulted in an unbalanced power structure, with too much power vested in the Parliament and too little
executive authority. In fact, the Crown retained substantial power
by several mechanisms, which Brzezinski does not explore. First,
the King exercised substantial control in the everyday governance
of Poland. The Sejm met for only six weeks every two years, leaving the King in almost unfettered control for the other ninety-eight
weeks. In addition, the King's estate was by far the country's largest; he was lord over one-sixth of Poland's lands and inhabitants. 33
This was a great source of practical power. Moreover, members of
the Senate (the upper house of Poland's National Assembly) were
appointed by the King. This served to dilute, to some extent,
Crown concessions to the nobility because the King could only be
removed from office for violating his loyalty oaths after three warn34
ings from the Senate.
So Brzezinski is right to conclude (p. 37) that sixteenth-century
Poland managed to effect a balance and separation of powers between the Sejm and the Crown, making for a constitutional government of limited powers. But sixteenth-century Poland was not a
democracy in the modern sense. As Brzezinski points out (p. 34),
the Sejm directly represented only the interests of the nobility, and
the law formally protected only that group's liberties. Other groups
in Polish society - burghers, Jews, and sundry other religious and
ethnic minorities - also benefitted from the general atmosphere of
liberty and toleration that prevailed in Renaissance Poland. Unfortunately, Brzezinski's preoccupation with the separation and balance of governmental powers leads him to neglect, to some extent,
important Polish innovations in civil and religious liberties during
the sixteenth century. Indeed, it was Renaissance Poland's approach to civil and religious liberties, far more than its balance and
separation of governmental powers, that characterized Poland's
First Republic and influenced constitutional theory and practice in
other European countries.
32. 1 DAviEs, supra note 26, at 321, 345.
33. Id. at 335.
34. See Wagner, supra note 28, at 137.
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Religious liberties were extended to minority groups in Poland
as early as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, when laws were enacted to protect Jewish religious practices. 35 The szlachta were the

guarantors of religious liberty not just for Jews but for virtually all
groups in Poland (excepting the peasantry) throughout the
Renaissance and into the Counter-Reformation. Poland had been
officially Catholic since the tenth century, but while other officially

Catholic countries were persecuting dissidents, Poland permitted
them to freely pursue their own creeds. And over the centuries

Poland's tradition of religious toleration became legendary

throughout Europe. 36 In addition to Moslems and Jews, Poland

welcomed millions of Christian dissidents of various persuasions,
including Uniates (Greek Catholics of the Slavonic Rite), Russian

Orthodox, Lutherans, Calvinists, Czech Brethren (the Hussites),
Polish Brethren (the Arians), Menonites, Schwenkfeldians, and
37

Anabaptists.
The religious toleration that prevailed in sixteenth-century

Poland was a function of the nobility's struggle to maintain its political predominance. The szlachta resisted calls for religious persecu-

tion for fear that legally sanctioned intolerance might result in
increased royal authority at its expense.38 This concern was legitimate because the nobility was divided among itself on the subject of
religion. During the Reformation many Polish nobles converted to

Calvinism, Lutheranism, Polish Antitrinitarianism, and the Czech

Brethren. 39 In fact, so many converted that at one point in officially
40
Catholic Poland, Roman Catholics were a minority in the Sejm.

35. In 1264, King Boleslaw the Pious placed the Jews under royal protection, assuring
their right to settle in Poland without fear of persecution. See BERNARD D. WEINRYB, THE
JEWS OF POLAD: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY IN
POLAND FROM 1100 TO 1800, at 1212 (1973). By a law of 1367, Jewish communities (Kahaly)
were granted autonomy to establish their own parliaments and courts. See Jerzy Kloczowski,
Some Remarks on the Social and Religious History of Sixteenth-Century Poland, in THm PoLISH RENAissACNc, supra note 28, at 96, 106. These legal protections encouraged Jews, who
were persecuted elsewhere in Europe, to emigrate to Poland. During the sixteenth century,
Poland's Jewish population swelled to more than 150,000. See WEnRYB, supra, at 114, 157.
36. For example, in the eighteenth century the French Catholic Rulhiere wrote about
Poland, '[t]his country, which in our day we have seen divided on the pretext of religion, is
the first state in Europe that exemplified tolerance. In this state, mosques arose between
churches and synagogues."' Quoted in WAckAw LEDNicKI, LIFE AND CULTURE OF POLAND
AS REFLECTED IN POLISH LrrERATURw

47 (1944) (citing H.

GRAPPIN, HISTOlRm DE LA

POLOGNE DES ORIGINES A 1922, at 43 (1922)). Indeed, in 1616 there were more than 100
mosques in Poland, serving a sizeable Moslem (mostly Tartar) population.
37. See generally JANusz TAzBm, A STATE WITHoUT STAKES: POLISH RELIGIOUS ToLERATION IN THE SI=cENTH AND SEVNTEENTH CENTURIES (1967).

38. See id. at 122.
39. See id.at 54. Calvinism was especially attractive to the Polish nobility because it
"admitted the right of opposition against royal authority... [but] not by individuals, [only]
by their lawful representatives." Id. at 56. Thus, Calvin supported the nobles against both
King and peasantry.
40. See Wagner, supra note 28, at 138.

2072

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:2062

Religious conflict inevitably would have pitted noble against noble,
to the advantage of the Crown.
The nobility's motivations, however, were not purely instrumental; a real streak of libertarianism runs through their writings. For
example, Jan Zamoyski, Chancellor of the Polish Crown during the
sixteenth century, wrote, "'I would give half of my life if those who
have abandoned the Roman Catholic Church should voluntarily return to its pale; but I would prefer giving all my life than to suffer
anybody to be constrained to do it, for I would rather die than witness such an oppression."'41 King Zygmunt August reflected the
religious tolerance of the time when he wrote, "'I am not King of
your consciences. I wish to be monarch equally of the sheep and of
the goats. I am afraid of tearing wheat as well as tares." 42 Even
the Catholic polemicist Piotr Skarga acquiesced in the general atmosphere of tolerance. His writings lashed out against heretics but
repudiated violence: "'Heresy is bad, but our neighbors and good
brothers sharing our love of the country know that nothing won by
force is durable, that anything secured under duress does not last
43
long."

Not only was religious toleration state policy in sixteenthcentury Poland; it was the law, codified in the 1573 Warsaw Confederation, a sublime but little-known statute reputed to be the first
document in European history to constitutionalize religious toleration. 44 It provided:
because there is not a small dissension in our country in the matter of
the Christian religion, we should like to prevent any harmful sedition
that could develop among the people for this reason. What we see in
other Kingdoms, we promise to all on our behalf and for our successors, for eternity, under oath, faith, honor, and our conscience, that no
matter who the dissidents from the [Roman Catholic] religion are, we
shall preserve peace among us, and not shed blood for difference in
religion or in Church observance. We shall not penalize ourselves for
this reason by confiscation of landed estates, by punishment of honor,
by imprisonment or exile. We also promise not to help in any way the
authorities or officers in such a procedure. We all shall be obliged to
oppose the shedding of blood, even if anyone would want to do this
for a good reason, under the pretext of a decree or of any court procedure ....
We have promised for ourselves and for our descendants to seriously respect and to preserve all those matters under the authority of
41. Quoted in LEDNICKI, supra note 36, at 47 (citing GRAPPmI, supra note 36, at 89).
42. Id

at 47 (citing PAUL SUPER, EvFNTs AND PERSONALITIES IN POLISH HISTORY

(1936)).
43. P. SKARGA, UPOMUNANIE DO EWANGIELiK6W 33 (1592) quoted in TAZBIR, supra note
37, at 149.
44. See James Miller, The Sixteenth-CenturyRoots of the Polish Democratic Tradition, in
POLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 25, at 21.
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our faith, honor and conscience. And we shall stand up against anyone who would like to oppose peace and to spoil public order; we

shall stand up against him for his perdition. 45
These guarantees applied officially only to the nobility but promised a degree of religious freedom in Poland found virtually nowhere else in Europe. Throughout the sixteenth century, only two
persons in Poland lost their
lives for their religious beliefs as a re46
sult of legal proceedings.
Along with (or perhaps as a consequence of) religious freedom
came substantial freedom of expression. Throughout the sixteenth
century, European intellectuals flocked to Poland, where they could
freely express and publish their views. As one immigrant wrote
from Poland to a colleague back in Italy in 1561, "'You could live
here in accordance with your ideas and preferences, in great, even
the greatest freedoms, including writing and publishing. No one is a
censor here."' 47 This was an exaggeration. There was official censorship in Poland, but it was most often recognized in the breach.
Dissident publishing houses flourished in the Polish-Lithuanian
Republic. The Polish government published an index of banned
books for the first time in the seventeenth century, and it too was
rarely enforced. When it was enforced, books were not destroyed
but placed in a special closed section of the Jagiellonian University
library in Krak6w. 48 Before 1627, no Polish nobleman was punished for publishing
a banned book; and no writer or publisher ever
49
life.
his
forfeited
The pervasive freedom of religion and expression was a central
and unique virtue of Poland's Renaissance Constitution, which
Brzezinski's analysis underappreciates. The extent of civil and religious freedom was virtually unmatched anywhere else in the world
at the time. And Polish libertarianism became a source of Polish
political influence in Western Europe. For not only did West European intellectuals flock to Poland to take advantage of its freedoms
45. Quoted in BASIC

SOURCES RELATED TO THE HISTORY OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN

EUROPE: A SELECTION 44-46 (Waclaw W. Soroka ed., 1966). A complete English translation
of the 1573 Warsaw Confederation appears in POLISH DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 25
at 131 (M.B. Biskupsi trans.).
46. See TAZBrR, supranote 37, at 117, 122. To the extent there was religious persecution
in sixteenth-century Poland, it was mostly unofficial. And in virtually every case when persecution was officially sanctioned, it went unenforced. In the 1520s, for example, King
Zygmunt August prohibited the propagation of Lutheranism in Poland under penalty of
death, but his edict was never enforced. See id. at 42. In 1552 the King granted the Catholic
clergy jurisdiction over cases of heresy, but he immediately suspended the grant of jurisdiction and later abrogated it entirely (in 1562-63). See id. at 65, 68, 82.
47. Id. at 133.
48. See id. at 143.
49. See id. at 144.
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but native Polish thinkers, such as Wawrzyniec Goglicki 50 and
Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski 5 l exported Polish libertarian and humanist ideas abroad.
Brzezinski briefly discusses Goglicki and his theory of government limited by the rule of law (pp. 35-36). But Goglicki's writings
did much more than exemplify Poland's democracy of the gentry;
they were highly influential in exporting Polish democratic ideas
throughout Europe. Goglicki intended his De optimo Senatore52 as

a primer on good government, 53 but it was also to be an original
and influential work of political philosophy. Presaging the Enlightenment, Goglicki equated godliness with reason and reason with
law.54 He argued for the rule of law as a constraint on both
Parliament and the Crown. And he asserted the ultimate sovereignty of the people in no uncertain terms:
50. Wawrzyniec Golicki was of noble lineage, born near Plock, and educated in Krak6w,
Padua, and Bologna, from whose university he received a doctorate in civil and canon law in
1566. After completing his education, he travelled to Rome, where he wrote the book that
brought him fame across Europe: De optimo Senatore ("The Accomplished Senator").
Later, Goglicki served as Chancellor of the Polish Crown and Bishop of Poznafi, which position he held at the time of his death in 1607. For more on Goglicki's life and work, see
Wenceslas J. Wagner et al., Laurentius GrimaldusGoslicius andHis Age - Modern Constitutional Law Ideas in the Sixteenth Century, reprintedin POLISH LAW THROUGHOUT THE Aos,

supra note 26, at 97.
51. Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski was born in Wolborz, in central Poland, in 1503. His family was of noble origins but modest means. They sent Andrzej at age 11 to study at the
Jagiellonian University in Krak6w, which was then at the height of its prestige as the center
for humanistic learning in Europe. After completing his education there, in 1523 Frycz
Modrzewski entered the service of Primate Jan Laski. This led to a life-long relationship with
the Laski family, who served as Frycz Modrzewski's protectors in Poland after he began
publishing his legal and political tracts. Like Frycz Modrzewski, the Laskis were reformminded; unlike him, they were immensely powerful.
Under Primate Laski's auspices, the young Frycz Modrzewski travelled abroad extensively, particularly to France and Germany, where he studied for some time at the University
of Vittenberg. While there, he served as the Primate's emissary to the German protestants.
After returning to Poland, in 1547 Frycz Modrzewski became secretary to King Zygmunt
August and carried out several diplomatic missions on his behalf. It was only toward the end
of his career that Frycz Modrzewski began to write and publish tracts concerning the nature
of government and international law.
52. First published in Latin in Venice in 1568. For an English translation from the original Latin, see LAURENCE GRIMALD GozLisKi, THE ACCOMPLISHED SENATOR (Oldisworth

trans., 1733). A facsimile of the first English translation (1598) is included in ANGLO-POLISH
RENAISSANCE TEXTS (Witold Chwalewik ed., 1968). However, the accuracy of that first
translation has been disputed. See W.J. STANJEwicz, THE ACCOMPLISHED SENATOR OF

LAuRENTrus GROSLICIUS 11-12 (1946); Teresa Baluk-Ulewiczowa, The Senator of
Wawrzyniec Goglicki and the Elizabethan Counsellor,in THE POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra

note 28, at 258,265-72. Most ironically, Goglicki's book was not translated into Polish before
the second half of the twentieth century. See H.E. Tytus Flipowicz, The Accomplished Senator, Remarks at the Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International
Law, in 26 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMER. Soc. INTL. L. 234, 234 (1932). Filipowicz was Po-

land's first (ever) Ambassador to the United States.
53. Such primers, known as specula or "mirrors" were quite popular during the Renaissance (Machiavelli's The Prince being another prime example of the genre). See BalukUlewiczowa, supra note 52, at 258.
54. See GOZLISKI, supra note 52, at 7-8.
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Sometimes a People, justly provoked and irritated by the Tyranny and

Usurpations of their Kings, take upon themselves the undoubted
Right of vindicating their own Liberties; and by a well-formed Con-

spiracy, or by open Arms, shake off the Yoke, drive out their Lords
and Masters, and take the Government entirely into their own Hands
55

These words might have been written 200 years later by Thomas

Jefferson. Indeed, intellectual historians have attempted to trace a
direct line of influence from Goslicki, through Father Bellarmine

and Algernon Sydney, to Jefferson. 56 Although a direct connection
remains elusive, there is no disputing that Goglicki's work was popular and influential in England at the turn of the seventeenth century.57 Queen Elizabeth herself may have been acquainted with the
book,58 and William Shakespeare certainly read it.59 The Polish
55. Id. at 32-33. According to F'lipowicz, supra note 52, at 238, this was the "earliest
statement in a political treatise of the right of revolution."
56. Supporters of this theory include Filipowicz, supra note 52, and Wagner et al., supra
note 50.
57. Two English translations of De optimo Senatore appeared in London in 1598 (reprinted in 1607) and 1733, respectively. By all accounts, the 1598 translation (which hardly
deserves to be called a "translation" for all of its "politically correct" editorial changes and
errors) was widely read.
58. In 1597 England was at war with Spain, and domestic conflict was increasing between
the English Crown and the opposition, leading ultimately to civil war in 1642. The English
Crown feared that Poland might ally militarily with Spain because the Polish and Spanish
Kings were related by marriage and English pirates had been intercepting and confiscating
Polish shipments of food and building materials bound for Spain. Any Polish political tract
published in England at that time was bound to find an interested audience. With respect to
England's domestic political turmoil, Goglicki's book, which denied absolute monarchy and
the divine right of Kings, was hardly favorable to Queen Elizabeth or the early Stuarts (who
reigned from 1603). In particular, Goglicki's assertion of popular sovereignty directly contradicted the absolutist claims of the early Stuarts, James I and Charles I. See, e.g., James I, A
Speach to the Lords and Commons of the Parliament at White-Hall (1609), reprinted in 1
THE POLMrCAL WRrnNGs OF JAMEs 1306,307 (Charles Howard MeIlwain ed., 1918) (asserting that the monarch is the sole fount of the constitution, law, and justice). And his assertion
of a right of resistance against tyrannical kings supported the antiroyalist movement that
arose in opposition to the early Stuarts and their assertions of absolutism; Goglicki's book
was widely quoted and cited in antiroyalist pamphlets and leaflets. See Filipowicz, supra note
52, at 239.
59. In fact, Shakespeare scholars in both England and Poland have acknowledged an important connection between the appearance of Goglicki's book in England in 1598 and
Shakespeare's masterpiece, Hamlet.
In 1904 Professor Israel Gollancz of Cambridge University first suggested that
Shakespeare not only read Goglicki but actually met him when Goglicki served, for a brief
time, as emissary to the Court of St. James. See Israel Gollancz, Bits of Timber: Some Observations on Shakespearean Names - 'Shylock' 'Polonius'" 'Malvolio, in A BOOK OF HOMAGE TO SHAKESPEARE 170, 174-77 (Israel Gollancz ed., 1916); see also Fdipowicz, supra note
52, at 239-40. This is speculative. What is not speculative, however, is that Shakespeare
greatly expanded the role of the King's counsellor in the second edition of Hamlet, which
appeared after the publication of Goglicki's book in England, and Shakespeare renamed the
counsellor Polonius (Latin for "a Pole"). See 7 NARRATwrvE AND DRAMATC SouRCES OF
SHAKEsPEARE 44-45 (Geoffrey Bullough ed., 1973); Flipowicz, supra note 52, at 239-40;
Gollancz, supra, at 174.
Polonius was, of course, a figure of derision and ridicule in Hamlet, described by the
prince as "a foolish prating knave." WiLLiAM SHAKESPEARE, THm TRAGEDY OF HAMLET
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democratic and libertarian constitutional ideas it exported helped
to fuel the antiroyalist opposition movement in the decades leading
up to the civil war of 1642.
Equally influential were the political/constitutional writings of
Frycz Modrzewski. In 1543, at the age of forty, he published his
first two treatises: Lascius sive de poena homicidii, an indictment of
class-based inequality in Polish criminal law, and Oratio Philaletis

Peripetici, in which he defended the political rights of Poland's
townspeople. Then, in 1551 Frycz Modrzewski wrote the work
which brought him fame throughout Europe, Commentariorum de
Republica emendanda libri quinque. Initially suppressed by the
Catholic clergy, the complete book was first published in Basel in
1554. It became widely available in Poland the same year. Its
theme was the improvement of church and state through reform of
customs, laws, the church, schools, and methods of warfare. 60
Strongly influenced by Erasmus, whose entire library the Laskis
Was this also Shakespeare's commentary on Goglicki's book? Or was Shakespeare merely ridiculing a common
type of courtier who Goglicki himself caricatured? Not surprisingly, English and Polish commentators have interpreted the role of Polonius in Hamlet differently.
The English Shakespeare scholar, Geoffrey Bullough, interprets Shakespeare's treatment
of Goglicki this way:
The verbose style of the [1598] translation and the somewhat commonplace worldly wisdom of the contents make it almost certain that Shakespeare enlarged the part of the
spying courtier in the light of it, mocking where it praised the stateman's wariness, sententiousness and gravity, and making Hamlet take the side of that objector to the counsellor's 'philosophy' who declares, 'that arte of thine is rather to be tearmed the science
of prating, then a knowledge whereby men attaine unto felicitie'. . . The name
'Polonius' attached to such a character would have comic point only after the publication
of Goslicius' book and when the dispute with Poland was still fresh, i.e., 1598-1602.
7 NARRATIvE AND DRAmAinc SoURcEs OF SHAKESPEARE, supra, at 46.
The Polish Shakespeare scholar, Witold Chwalewik, provides a very different interpretation of Goglicki's effect on Shakespeare:
The objection equally obvious and seemingly crushing is that the figure Shakespeare has
drawn, clearly with a critical intention, does not at all resemble the ideal portrait
Goglicki is concerned to present. And it has to be admitted that the two are, in fact,
quite unlike. What has been overlooked, however, is that Goglicki's work, besides the
ideal norm, contains also a sketched-in caricature, and that this fits the facts of the case
perfectly.
ANGLO-POLISH RENAiSsANCE TE=XS, supra note 52, at 33-34; see also Laurentius Grimaldus
Goslicius, The Counsellor,reprinted in ANGLO-PoLIsH RENAISSANcE Trs,
supra note 52,
at 45, 93. What Bullough neglects, according to Chwalewik's interpretation, are important
textual similarities between the 1598 translation of De optimo Senatore and Hamlet. For
example, just as Hamlet castigates Polonius for being a "following prating Knave," Goglicki
derides common courtiers (in contrast to his ideal counsellor) as "pratling Orators and witless Philosophers." ld. at 93. Chwalewik points to this and other textual similarities between
De optimo Senatoreand Hamlet to argue that Shakespeare was not ridiculing Go~icki's political philosophy but was simply adapting (or appropriating) Goglicki's portrayal of a common
type of inferior counsellor.
Whichever (if either) interpretation is correct, the important point for present purposes is
that Goglicki's book made a significant impression in England when it was first translated
and published there in 1598.
60. See Waldemar Vois6, Polish Renaissance Political Theory: Andrzej Frycz
Modrzewsk4 in THE POLISH RENAISSANCE, supra note 28, at 174, 175.
PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 4. (Jack Randall Crawford ed., 1917).
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had purchased and brought to Poland, in de Republica emendanda
Frycz Modrzewski attacked the unwise, inane, and grossly inequitable political and social customs of his own country. In particular,
he took on his own class, the ruling szlachta. Just as the Polish nobility denied the inborn superiority of kings, so Frycz Modrzewski
rejected the inborn superiority of the nobility in calling for a state
governed by men distinguished by merit rather than birth. As merit
required education, Frycz Modrzewski became the first among the
humanists to call for secular control of schools and education directed toward public service.
While the most influential parts of de Republica emendanda
61 Frycz
were those that dealt with war and its resolution,
Modrzewski's book was at least equally concerned with internal
state conflicts. Believing that all social classes were necessary for
the efficient and virtuous functioning of the state, he condemned
any oppression, especially of the peasantry, and called for the abolition of serfdom. Frycz Modrzewski argued that the peasant should
own his land, free from seizure by his lord, and be free to leave at
all times.
Frycz Modrzewski also believed strongly in equality before the
law. Echoing his earlier pamphlet, Lascius sive de poena homicidii,
he argued in de Republica emendanda that all citizens, be they noblemen or peasants, should be entitled to justice. If the law must
discriminate, he contended, then it should punish more severely the
magnates and governors who commit crimes though they have less
reason to do so. Moreover, Frycz Modrzewski championed freedom of expression, especially the freedom to criticize the ruling
classes, including the King: "Rulers who are not prepared to tolerate freedom of speech," he argued, "should govern over 'dumb animals' and not over intelligent men." 62
By the beginning of the seventeenth century, de Republica
emendanda had appeared in Spanish and German translations; it
61. Frycz Modrzewski believed that the only way one state could convince its neighbors
of its peaceful intentions was to resist war at all costs. Presaging the 1573 Warsaw
Confederation by a generation, he argued that religious differences should never serve as
grounds for war. For international disputes, he recommended specific procedures for mediation: each party to a conflict would choose a "judge" who, released from his oath of loyalty
to his own King during the period of mediation, might secure a timely and just settlement.
Each nation would then be bound by the judges' ruling, as by a treaty. In case negotiations
failed, Frycz Modrzewski maintained, like Grotius after him, that a just war could not be lost
and an unjust war could not be won. See Grotius' VIA AD PACEM ECCLESIAMCAM (1642)
(expressing the same attitude and frequently citing Modrzewski). A war was just only if
undertaken as a last resort to avenge pernicious wrongs. Thus, for Frycz Modrzewski, war
was "an act designed to administer justice in international relations." Vois6, supra note 60, at
184.
62. Quoted in OsKAR HALECKI, A HISTORY OF PoLAND 61 (1977). Paradoxically, Frycz
Modrzewski called for tough sedition laws - in a virtuous and just Republic such as his,
whoever might engage in sedition would, presumably, be unjust.
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was later translated into English and Russian. Frycz Modrzewski's
work was esteemed by the likes of Grotius, Bayle, and de Real, but
was condemned by some who opposed Frycz Modrzewski's progressive views. 63 Besides Frycz Modrzewski and Goglicki, a number
of other Polish intellectuals contributed works of great value to
sixteenth-century Polish constitutional development and, more gen-

erally, to European legal and political thought. 64 Their writings

propagated the very libertarian constitutional system in Renaissance Poland that facilitated them, and influenced, if only indirectly,
the move from absolute monarchy toward constitutional governance in other European countries.
Tim DECLINE OF POLAND'S FIRST REPUBLIC: 1600-1791
Between the end of the sixteenth century and the enactment of
Poland's landmark Constitution of 1791, political and economic
conditions deteriorated. As Brzezinski puts it, "the important, but
unrefined, constitutional reforms developed in Poland during the
thirteenth through sixteenth centuries became distorted in the
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, leading to an
inefficient and ineffective Polish government" (p. 39). The balance
of powers that had existed during the sixteenth century tilted increasingly toward the nobility, which curtailed the King's authority
and limited state power to such extents that the Polish-Lithuanian
Republic grew too weak to defend itself against increasingly powerful foreign aggressors (p. 39). As a result, from the end of the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, Poland lost half its
territory to Russia, Sweden, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary.
The chief institutional villain in Brzezinski's story, which reflects
the standard account of the demise of the balance of power in
Poland during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is the

liberum veto. As noted earlier, 65 the veto required unanimity for
legislative action; a single dissenting member of the Sejm could
block legislative action and even dissolve an entire session of Parliament. Indeed, according to Brzezinski, the liberum veto caused the
adjournment without action of forty-eight out of fifty-five biennial
63. In 1576, the Frenchman Jean Bodin wrote in Six Books of the Republic: "'The Polish
writer Andreas Fricius even writes that it is an allegedly great mistake not to apply the same
punishment to patricians and plebeians, the rich and poor, citizens and foreigners; nothing
more absurd could have been written by anyone who, like him, wishes to shape the laws and
customs of his Republic."' Quoted in Vois6, supra note 60, at 186. But then, as Frycz
Modrzewski's biographer, Waldemar Vois6 has observed, critics in the same era also condemned as absurd the ideas of the Polish astronomer Copernicus. Id. at 187.
64. These included the King's Chancellor Jan Zamoyski, the Protestant Andrzej Wolan,
and Stanislaw Sokolowski, who wrote of the strict correlation between liberty and equality.
65. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.

May 1999]

Polish Constitutionalism

2079

meetings of the Sejm held after 1652 (p. 39). But abuse of the veto
was as much a symptom as a cause of Poland's political problems.
According to Wenceslas J. Wagner, the general repudiation of
the veto is historically myopic: "[H]istory shows that for many long
years there was no abuse of the veto in Poland." Before 1652 "the
deputy who had an opinion different from the others was giving up
his point of view if he knew that he was isolated and his approach
was contrary to that of the others - and did not use his right to the
veto.166 Wagner's view is not wholly accurate, however. As
Norman Davies has explained, the liberum veto created several
"difficulties in the early decades of the Republic, including one in
1580 which blocked all taxation for that year." 67 Davies concurs,
however, in Wagner's general assessment of the veto, noting that
before the mid-seventeenth century it "[u]sualy... produced nothing more than a temporary delay," as the marshal of the Sejm
worked to negotiate a resolution to the conflict. 68 It is also important to remember that the liberum veto existed during the period
when the Polish-Lithuanian Republic blossomed into the largest
and most powerful country in Europe. So it could not have been
the very existence of the institution that caused the state to weaken
substantially during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
What did change between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries was the way in which the liberum veto was used and its consequences. Before the 1652 Sejm the veto was used only to block
individual legislative initiatives; in that year it was used for the first
69
time to negate the Diet's entire agenda and dissolve the session.
As Wagner explains, the liberum veto changed into a "liberum
rumpo ...causing the dissolution of the Diet and the annihilation

of all its decisions, making its deliberations fruitless. ' 70 This was to
the great advantage of the Republic's foreign enemies, who "retained magnates who could break the Sejm at the drop of a
ducat. ' '71 Consequently, as Brzezinski notes (p. 39), most subsequent meetings of the Sejm were broken, causing the Polish state to
grow ever weaker, less able to defend itself against foreign influence and, ultimately, incursion.
Whether the liberum veto was a cause or merely a symptom of
the demise of the first Polish Republic is unclear. Without doubt it
66. Wenceslas J. Wagner, Some Comments on Old "Privileges"and the "Liberum Veto,"
in CONSTITUTION AND REFORM iN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY PoLAND: THE CONSTITUTION OF
3 MAY 1791, at 51, 59 (Samuel Fszman ed., 1997).
67. 1 DAVmS, supra note 26, at 346.
68. Id. at 345.
69. See id. at 346.
70. Wagner, supra note 66, at 58.
71. 1 DAVI.S, supra note 26, at 347.
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was, like so many liberal-democratic institutions, inefficient. Without it Poland might have forestalled invasion and partition, but
even that is not certain. What is certain is that the veto evolved into
a useful tool by which foreign powers could gain control of domestic Polish political affairs.
But the liberum veto was hardly the only cause of Poland's demise at the end of the eighteenth century. In fact, abuse of the veto
coincided with a general erosion of civil and religious liberties in
Poland, which gave way before a burgeoning and increasingly malevolent Polish nationalism that itself was a symptom of foreign agitation. Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the
Polish state grew less and less tolerant of "non-Poles" (especially
Jews) and religious dissidents. Freedom of speech and religion
were restricted. Ironically, this took place in Poland just as other
European countries were moving towards the increased liberalism
of the Enlightenment.

THE 1791

CONSTITUTION:

APOGEE OF POLISH CONSTITUTIONALISM?

Brzezinski views Poland's 1791 Constitution as "the blossoming
of constitutional government in Poland" (p. 39). This reflects the
conventional wisdom both inside and outside of Poland.7 2 Poland's
1791 Constitution was, after all, the world's second written constitution (after the U.S. Constitution of 1787), and Europe's first. And
it was, in many respects, a remarkable legal document for its time,
combining some of the libertarian political philosophy of Renaissance Poland with more recent constitutional ideas from home and
abroad. For Poles, the 1791 Constitution remains to this day an object of veneration - Poland celebrates Constitution Day on May
3rd each year. But this has less to do with the document's contents
than with what the 1791 Constitution represents for the Polish nation: a statement of the Polish state's principles on the brink of its
dismemberment by foreign powers.
Once again, Brzezinski's analysis of the 1791 Constitution (pp.
39-44) focuses on the way it separated powers between branches of
government. But many of the most progressive ideas it contained
- federalism, decentralized state power, legislative supremacy,
habeas corpus (which the 1791 Constitution extended to all property owners), religious liberty, and Article V's declaration that all
power emanates from the will of the people - were rooted in
sixteenth-century legislation and the legal/political theories of
72. See, e.g., Zbigniew Szczqska, The FundamentalPrinciplesConcerningthe PoliticalSys.

tem of the 3 May, 1791 Government Statute, in CONSTITUTON AND REFORM, supra note 66, at
287. The 1791 Constitution is reprinted in English translation in Potish DEMOCRATIC
THOUGHT,

supra note 25, at 168 (Christopher Kasparek trans.).
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Goglicki, Frycz Modrzewski, Sokolowski, and Myszkowski. Ironically, many of the truly novel ideas found in the 1791 Constitution
-

the true products of the Polish "Enlightenment" -

appear re-

gressive in light of Poland's earlier constitutional history. These regressive ideas included the reinstitution of hereditary monarchy and
restrictions on religious freedom.
Brzezinski applauds the 1791 Constitution for ostensibly creating "a clear right to religious freedom" (p. 44), but the extent of the
right was anything but clear. In fact, Article I of the Constitution
expressly limited religious freedom to practices "according to the
laws of the country." 73 In other words, the Constitution guaranteed
only as much religious freedom as state policy sanctioned. Such an
empty guarantee was worthy of Poland's infamous Communist
Constitution of 1952.74 Moreover, the 1791 Constitution outlawed
dissidence by prohibiting conversion from Roman Catholicism to
any other creed, thus abrogating religious liberties agreed to by the
1573 Warsaw Confederation. 75 The 1791 Constitution also adopted
in full the Cities Act, enacted earlier that year by the Sejm, which,
among other things, limited habeas corpus protections and denied
Jews citizenship in cities. Thus, 1791 marked a sea-change in official Polish-Jewish relations. The Cities Act and the Constitution reflected the rise of anti-Semitism among the higher estates. Finally,
the Constitution marked the end of unity among the nobility, as
"roughly 400,000 propertyless nobles lost their political rights and
declined to the status of free citizens in either the burgher
or peas'76
ant estate depending on residence and occupation.
These more regressive, antidemocratic, and antilibertarian features of Poland's 1791 Constitution reflected a burgeoning Polish
nationalism. Despite professions of respect for religious minorities,
the authors of the 1791 Constitution proved themselves to be less
than tolerant. For example, Father Hugo Kolltaj, "[a] leading
member of the Polish Enlightenment" and "major architect" of the
1791 Constitution,77 proposed compulsory assimilation of Jews and
declared that "'[a]ll those Jews permanently or temporarily settled
in the states of the Commonwealth, without exception, are to shave
their beards, cease to wear Jewish robes, and wear those that are
used by Christians in the states of the Commonwealth.'" 78 Not
73. POL. CONST. (1791) art. 1.
74. On Poland's 1952 Constitution, see infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.

75. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
76. Daniel Z. Stone, Democratic Thought in Eighteenth Century Poland,in POLISH DEMocRAInc THOUGHT, supra note 25, at 55, 67.

77. Joan S.Skurnowicz, Polish Szlachta Democracy at the Crossroads,1795-1831, in PoUSH DEMOcRATIC THOUGHT, supra note 24, at 73, 75.
78. ANDRZEJ WAUCKi,
TIONHOOD:

THE ENUGHIENMENT AND THE BIRTH OF MODERN NA-

POLISH POLiTICAL THOUGHT

FROM NOBLE REPUBLICANISM

TO TADEUSZ
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only were these proposals inconsistent with Kollqtaj's professed respect for "the fights of the Jews as a religious minority" 79 but they
contradicted Jewish liberties granted by Polish Kings and Diets
since the thirteenth century.8 0
Thus, the meaning of Poland's 1791 Constitution is more complex than Brzezinski admits. There is no denying its symbolic status
for the Polish nation. As Brzezinski suggests, it has represented for
Poles a legacy of independence, sovereignty, democracy, and "mature political culture" that they were unable to recover for 200
years (p. 45). That same Constitution, however, abandoned many
of Poland's most noble principles, including those embodied in the
1573 Warsaw Confederation. And by according constitutional status to anti-Semitism, the 1791 Constitution created a disgraceful
legacy with which Poland struggles to this day.
Finally, Brzezinski neglects Tadeusz Kogciuszko's 1794 Uprising,
which had virtually as much significance for Poland's 1791 Constitution as the Bill of Rights had for the U.S. Constitution. As Norman
Davies has suggested, the 1794 "National Rising" rather than the
1791 Constitution itself was the "natural culmination of the reformist movement."' 81
The 1791 Constitution was in effect for only fourteen months
when Russia invaded Poland. In January 1793, the victorious Russian army entered into an agreement with Prussia to partition
Poland. This marked the end of the legal life of the 1791 Constitution, but secured its place as the romantic symbol of Polish independence. On March 24, 1794 Tadeusz Kogciuszko, hero of the
American Revolution (and Brigidier General in the U.S. Army),
led an all-out effort to regain that independence. It was not simply
an insurrection but a revolution. Even before the battle was joined,
Kogcuiszko and the other leaders of the Polish army established a
Supreme National Council to direct a new, independent government. Kogciuszko knew full well, however, that the success of his
venture depended on the full participation of all classes, including
the peasants, who had little reason to fight under the 1791 Constitution, which kept them in serfdom. So, on March 24, 1794 he issued
the "Act of Insurrection of the Citizens and Inhabitants of the
Palatinate of Cracow," which promised to free the peasantry as a
whole from servitude. This, in effect, amended the 1791 Constitution and brought out the peasantry en masse. Fighting with scythes,
KOgciuszKo 74 (1989) (quoting

1 HUGO

KA4TOJ, LisTu ANONIMA: PRAwo POLITYCZNF

NARODU POLSKiEGO 296 (B. Lesnodorski & H. Wereszycka eds., 1954)).

79. Id.
80. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
81. See Jercy Kowecki, The Kofcivszko Insurrection:Continuationand Radicalizationof
Change, in CONsTrUnON AND REFORM IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY POLAND, supra note

at 497.

66,
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they helped Ko~ciuszko's army rout General Tormasov's Russian
forces at Raclawice. Warsaw and Wilno were liberated, and Poland
reemerged, if only briefly, as an independent and far more democratic country.8 2 On May 7, 1794, Ko9ciuszko issued the Manifesto
83
of Polaniec which freed the peasantry from servitude
The Russians and Prussians managed to suppress the uprising
before the end of 1794. In 1795, "Poland ceased to exist as an independent state" (p. 45), and in January 1797, the Russians,
Prussians, and Austro-Hungarians signed a final Treaty of Partition
at St. Petersburg. From that time until the end of World War I,
Poland was ruled from abroad without even a patina of constitutional legality. 84

Tim CONSTITUTON OF POLAND'S SECOND

REPUBLIC,

1921-39

At the end of World War I the Allied forces jointly guaranteed
the "'restoration of Poland in its historical and geographic limits.' "85 This was easier said than done. Different regions of the
newly reunited country had been subject for more than a century to
the disparate social, cultural, economic, political, and legal norms of
three foreign sovereigns: Russia, Prussia, and Austria-Hungary.
Under the circumstances, it is remarkable that the process of
constitution-drafting, which began in 1919, took only two years to
complete.
Brzezinski is critical of the final product, the 1921 Constitution,
because, in his view, the legislative branch it created was too strong
and the executive was too weak (pp. 48-49). Consequently, the
Constitution "provided a political structure that sowed the seeds of
ineffective government, reminiscent of pre-1791 Poland" (p. 51).
What the newly reborn Polish state needed most was stability,
which the 1921 Constitution failed to provide.
Brzezinski's assessment of the 1921 Constitution is overly harsh.
In Poland's circumstances, it is doubtful that any constitution, no
matter how well structured and balanced its system of governmental powers, could have provided sufficient stability. There were
simply too many political and, especially, economic problems that
could not be resolved by constitution writing. And, to its credit, the
1921 Constitution was an entirely modern and democratic constitution, far closer in letter and spirit to Poland's new 1997 Constitution
82.
83.
84.
85.

See 1 DAviEs, supra note 26, at 538-39.
See id. at 539.
See id. at 540-42.
2 id. at 388 (1982).
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than the 1791 Constitution or any other constitutional document in
86
Polish history.
The 1921 Constitution continued many of the traditions of
Poland's earlier constitutions, including legislative supremacy but
with a broader democratic focus. The 1921 Constitution was the
first in Poland's history to reject monarchy altogether and establish
participatory democracy based on proportional representation regardless of social class. In the king's place sat a weak president,
clearly subservient to Parliament. The Sejm had sole responsibility
for the national budget, constitutional amendments, the army, and
taxation. "[A] simple majority vote of the Sejm could force a single
minister, the entire executive cabinet, or even the President, to resign" (p. 49). The president, by contrast, could not dissolve the
Sejm; he did not even possess authority to veto legislation. In time
of war, the president could not serve as commander-in-chief of the
armed forces but could only appoint one upon the recommendation
of the Council of Ministers (the prime minister's cabinet). And, as
Brzezinski points out, the Council of Ministers was directly answerable to the Sejm, not to the president (p. 50). In sum, the president's role was purely formal.
This was by design. Poland's constitution drafters feared that a
strong presidency might "allow a single dynamic leader," specifically Marshal J6zef Pilsudski, "to dominate the government" (p.
50). Pilsudski was the charismatic hero of Poland's 1920 war against
Russia, the head of Poland's provisional government, and a selfstyled (non-Marxist) socialist. By creating a weak presidency,
Pilsudski's opponents managed to dissuade him from participating
in the government. Was the cost of this an "impotent
'sejmocracy,"' as Brzezinski (following Pilsudski) alleges (p. 48)?
It is not at all clear that the unbalanced political structure created by the 1921 Constitution was a significant cause of Poland's
travails during the interwar period. It certainly cannot be said to
have caused the economic crisis that discredited successive Polish
governments and ultimately led to Pilsudski's coup d'gtat in 1926.
Would Poland have been better off with a stronger executive from
the beginning? Almost certainly. Would it have averted Poland's
postwar economic difficulties? At best it might have ameliorated
their impact marginally. Would outright dictatorship have provided
greater "stability" than Poland's democratic constitution? It is entirely possible. Even so, would that be reason for criticizing Poland's 1921 Constitution?
86. The 1921 Constitution was codified at 1921 DZIENNIK UsrAw ("Journal of Laws")
[hereinafter Dz. U.] No. 44, item 267. For an English translation of the 1921 Constitution see
PoLsKm KoNryTucm (Constitution, 1921) located at <http://www-personal.engin.umich.
edu/-zbigniew/Constitutions/kl921.E.html>.
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Consider the circumstances. Poland was attempting to rebuild
(or more accurately, to build for the first time) a modern state and
economy after a century-and-a-quarter of foreign rule, in postwar
circumstances of massive geographical and economic dislocation
and differentiation, high inflation, internal ethnic strife, as well as
military hostility from Russia, the Ukraine, and Lithuania. That
Poland managed to rebuild itself at all is remarkable enough. And,
when viewed in its historical context, Poland's 1921 Constitution is
a remarkable document. It subordinated
the executive government to a bicameral Sejm elected by universal
suffrage, guaranteed the legal equality and protection by the State of
all citizens irrespective of 'origin, nationality, language, race, or religion'; the abolition of hereditary and class privileges and titles; the
rights of property, whether private or collective; the regulation of
land-owning with a view to creating 'private farming units capable of
adequate productivity'; the rights of free expression, freedom of the
press, freedom of assembly, freedom of conscience, and religious
practice; the right to unemployment and sickness benefit, to protection against the abuses of child, female, and injurious employment, to
education at the expense of the state; and the retention by Minorities
of their specific nationality, language, and character. 87
Unfortunately, this liberal-democratic constitution with its
promise of a welfare state was implemented in a political climate of
nationalism and radicalisms of all stripes. Beyond the passage of
the Constitution itself, disparate political parties could not agree on
the nature or direction of state policies. Economic conditions,
meanwhile, were horrendous. Already high rates of unemployment
and inflation were growing ever higher; investment capital was in
short supply; and Poland's economy was underindustrialized.
Norman Davies does not exaggerate when he suggests that "[i]n the
first years of the Republic's existence, the entire economic system
had to be constructed from scratch." 88 What constitution in the
world could have ensured stability under such circumstances? Arguably, Poland's first postpartition governments faced greater challenges than those that confronted the first postcommunist
government of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1989.
The political and economic problems that plagued successive
governments in postpartition Poland, along with the perceived need
for institutional reforms, led Marshal Pilsudski to stage a coup in
1926.89 Afterwards, he established a new political party, the

Bezpartyjny Blok Wsp6tpracy z Rzqdem (The Nonparty Block for
Cooperation with the Government, or BBWR), to govern the coun87. 2 DAviEs, supra note 26, at 402-04.

88. Id.at 415.
89. See id. at 421.
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try. 90 At Pilsudski's behest, the 1921 Constitution was amended to
provide for more effective and efficient government. Specifically,
the 1926 Amendments authorized the President to issue decrees
when the Sejm was not in session, and gave the President for the
first time the power to dissolve Parliament. Despite their "undemocratic origin," Brzezinski suggests, these Amendments improved the 1921 Constitution by better balancing the powers of the
legislative and executive branches of government, thus providing
greater stability to Poland's political system (p. 53). In reality, however, the Amendments did not stabilize much of anything.
Pilsudski's regime, the Senacia, held power until the Nazis invaded Poland in 1939. Its rule, however, was hardly stable. Its governments were just as short-lived as those before the coup.
Certainly, the 1926 Constitutional Amendments did not stabilize
Poland's economy, which continued to struggle, particularly after
1928-29, when the agricultural sector "fell into a decline from which
it never fully recovered." 91 Nor did the Amendments prevent or
alleviate the general economic decline that gripped Poland and the
rest of Europe in the 1930s in the wake of America's Great
Depression.
Pilsudski and his party soon grew dissatisfied with the 1926
Amendments to the 1921 Constitution; they called for a completely
new constitution to provide even more executive authority, so that
the President could "act effectively and decisively" to solve the nation's economic problems (p. 53). The result was the 1935 Constitution, which declared that "the one and undivided power of the state
was concentrated in the person of the President of the Republic and
that the government, the sejm, the senate, the armed forces, the
tribunals, and the state audit were subordinate to him." The President, meanwhile, was made answerable only to "God and history."'92 Brzezinski quite rightly labels the 1935 Constitution
"undemocratic" (p. 55). It marked "a decisive break with liberal
parliamentarism" (p. 56), which had been a consistent feature of
Polish constitutions since the sixteenth century.
Ironically, Pilsudski died just three weeks after the 1935 Constitution was enacted, leaving Poland leaderless. In the new constitutional system the Sejm was too weak to run the country; the
President held the lion's share of power. Pilsudski, however, had
been the only man in Poland popular and charismatic enough to
90. See id. at 421. Interestingly, almost 70 years later, then Polish President Lech Walgsa
recreated the BBWR because he thought the lack of executive authority under the 1989
Amendments to Poland's 1952 Constitution hampered effective government. See infra note
109.
91. 2 DAviEs, supra note 26, at 411.

92. Poi- CONST. (1935), 1935 Dz. U. No. 30, item 227, arts. 2, 3.
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wield that power effectively. In his place sat a collection of colonels
who ruled Poland by martial committee. Their petty infighting led
to inconsistent policies that left the Polish state and economy adrift
easy pickings for yet another partition by Germany and Russia,
this time under the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939.
When Hitler's Germany attacked Poland in August 1939, the
Polish government went into exile, first to Paris, and then, when
Paris fell to the Germans, to London. This effectively terminated
the 1935 Constitution. Any hope the government-in-exile had of
returning to Poland after the war to re-establish constitutional government was wishful thinking. The Soviets had other plans for
postwar Poland, plans that were in essence ratified by the Allied
powers at Yalta.
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC,

1944-1989
All of Poland's constitutional history to this point is covered in
one brief chapter of Brzezinski's book. Ironically, he subsequently
devotes an entire chapter to constitutional theory and practice in
communist Poland, where constitutional law mattered less than
Party policy, and where both were largely dictated from Moscow.
Yet Poland's Communist Constitution of 1952 is undeniably part of
Poland's constitutional heritage. At some level a constitution is a
constitution regardless of its pedigree, its political legitimacy, or
even its legal status.
Brzezinski is plainly ambivalent about the constitution of
Poland under communism. Indeed, his title for the chapter, "From
Constitutionalism to Totalitarianism," implies that constitutionalism and communism are antithetical. And Brzezinski notes, "the
promulgation of a communist constitution in 1952 resulted in the
rejection of the fundamental themes of constitutionalism" (p. 72).
Indeed, the very notion of communist constitutionalism is
paradoxical.
More important than the paradox of communist constitutionalism for Brzezinski's purposes is to understand that constitutional
developments in postcommunist Poland have not been sui generis,93
but have evolved within preexisting institutional and historical contexts. An important theme of Brzezinski's book appears for the
first time in the chapter on People's Poland: the continuity of institutions across historical epochs. 94 In order to understand constitu93. Justice O'Connor has suggested as much. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
94. This theme of continuity amid change has become familiar in works about postcommunist Poland. See, e.g., DANIEL H. COLE, INSTrTIrNG ENViRONMENTAL PROTECTION:
FROM RED TO GREEN IN POLAND (1998) (stressing the importance of systemic changes in

Poland since 1989, but also recognizing the continuity of Polish environmental policies from
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tional developments in postcommunist P oland, one must
understand what Poland was transitioning from.
Poland's 1952 Constitution was, in Brzezinski's words, "patterned on the Soviet Constitution of 1936, retaining much of the
original language of that document and reflecting major inputs by
Soviet constitutional theorists.19 5 It was, indeed, "a Polish language
equivalent of the Soviet Constitution" (p. 63). Despite its liberaldemocratic pretenses - provisions ostensibly guaranteeing universal suffrage and freedom of speech, religion, and assembly Poland's 1952 Constitution created a power structure, through institutions such as "socialist democracy" and "socialist legality," which
vested all power in the Communist Party.
Actually, the Constitution did not so much create as reflect the
reality of Communist hegemony. To claim that the 1952 Constitution vested power in Poland's Communist Party would be to invert
cause and effect. The Party already had power, which it used to
foist the Constitution on a disaffected population. It was not the
Constitution that gave power to the Party but the Party that gave
power to the Constitution.
Poland's 1952 Constitution was not a constitution in the liberaldemocratic sense of "the highest law of the land." In fact, it was
hardly a legal document at all. The various powers it created and
the rights and liberties it supposedly guaranteed were not selfexecuting but had to be implemented by "'ordinary statutes and
other normative acts."' 96 And the Constitution did not require the
enactment of implementing legislation. So, it was entirely without
legal force, except to the extent the Party/state chose to enforce it.
And that, of course, was a matter of policy rather than law. Consequently, in People's Poland there was no constitutional law, only
constitutional policy. And that policy was determined, and subject
to change at any time, by the PZPR in consultation with its "fraternal ally" in Moscow.
In 1976 the Constitution was amended, in part to better reflect
this reality. The Amendments "formally recognized the Party's
political monopoly" by institutionalizing its "'leading role"' in the
the communist era to the postcommunist era); KAzrMIERZ Z. POZrNASIU, POLAND'S PRO-

TR asmoN (1996) (claiming that Poland's transition to market democracy had its
roots in economic and institutional reforms of the early 1980s).
95. P. 63. The 1952 Constitution is codified at 1952 Dz. U. No. 33, item 232. For an
English-language translation of the Constitution (as amended in 1954, 1957, 1960, 1961, and
1963), see III AMos J. PEASLEE, CONsrrrto Ns OF NAnONs 709 (1968).
96. P. 66 (quoting in translation Orzeczenie z dnia 4 czerwcu 1955 r., Orzecznictwo Sqdu
Najwizszego 93 (1955)); see also Mark F. Brzezinski, The Emergence of Judicial Review in
Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, 41 AMER. J. COMP. L. 153, 168 (1993) (arguing that
ordinary statutes had greater legal status than constitutional provisions).
TRACrED
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building of socialism. 97 And they "enshrined Poland's fraternal ties
with the Soviet Union."98 In the eyes of many Poles, this implicit
subordination of national sovereignty to a historical foe constituted
an act of treason by the PZPR. Thus, the 1976 Amendments accomplished what was seemingly impossible: they further discredited Poland's Communist Constitution. They also catalyzed
opposition to the communist regime (pp. 73-74). Within a year after the 1976 Constitutional Amendments were enacted, the Party
was "confronted by a united and nationally-based organization
making fundamental political and economic demands" (p. 74).
Within three years, this organization evolved into the national
movement known as Solidarity, which ultimately toppled the PZPR
from power.
The 1952 Constitution was amended again in 1982, during the
period of martial law. These Amendments are quite significant for
Brzezinski's history of constitutionalism in Poland because they include two provisions that exemplify his theme of institutional continuity across historical epochs. The 1982 Amendments authorized
the creation of two organizations "characteristic of Western democratic constitutionalism": a Constitutional Tribunal and a Tribunal
of State. Although scholars have debated the value of these organizations within the communist system, 99 there is no denying that
they have evolved into important institutional components of
Poland's postcommunist constitutional democracy.
The 1982 Constitutional Amendments created a nominally independent Constitutional Tribunal to replace the Tribunal of State
as arbiter of the Constitution. 100 The Tribunal was charged with
reviewing the constitutionality of statutes and executory regulations. Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, though, it
was not the final arbiter of Poland's Constitution; Tribunal decisions could be overruled by a simple majority vote of the Sejm. As
Brzezinski notes, "[t]hroughout its existence, the Tribunal's practice
of judicial review has been curbed by limitations included in the
97. P. 73. The 1976 Constitutional Amendments are codified at 1976 Dz. U. No. 7, item
36.
98. P. 73. Ironically, it was in the same year that Poland constitutionalized its subordination to the Soviet Union that Gerald Ford made his famous blunder in the 1976 Presidential
debates (against Jimmy Carter), declaring Poland free and independent of Soviet influence.

99. For an example of the debate, compareLeszek Garlicki, ConstitutionalDevelopments
in Poland,32 ST. Louis U. L.J.713 (1988) with Stanislaw Frankowski, A Comment on Professor Garlicki'sArticle "Constitutional Developments in Poland". The Lyrics Sound Familiar,
But Are They Really Playing Our Song?, 32 ST. Louis U. L.J. 737 (1988).

100. The 1982 Constitutional Amendments are codified at 1982 Dz. U. No. 11, item 83.
As with all constitutional provisions, those creating that Tribunal of State and Constitutional
Tribunal had to be implemented through ordinary legislation. The Sejm did not actually institute the Constitutional Tribunal until 1985. See Ustawa z dnia 29 kwietnia 1985 r. o
Trybunalne Konstytucyinym [Act of Apr. 29, 1985 on the Constitutional Tribunal], 1985 Dz.
U. No. 22, item 98.
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1985 Act to ensure that the Tribunal would not emancipate itself
nor overstep politically acceptable limits" (p. 158). The very existence of a Constitutional Tribunal, however, seemed at odds with
communist constitutional practice. The notion that statutes should
have to conform to the Constitution was absurd in a system where,
as already noted, ordinary legislation had higher legal status than
constitutional provisions.
Ironically, the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal itself exemplified the higher legal status of ordinary legislation. The
Tribunal existed only on constitutional paper for three years before
the Sejm enacted legislation actually instituting it in 1985. (One
wonders whether the Tribunal had jurisdiction to adjudicate the
constitutionality of its own enabling statute.) The question begs answering: What could it mean for a statute to be unconstitutional in
a system where ordinary statutes possessed higher legal authority
than constitutional provisions? Brzezinski does not provide an answer to this question but notes: "[F]rom 1986 until 1989 ... the

very existence of the Tribunal conflicted with the fundamental assumptions of the communist regime" (p. 158).
Nevertheless, Brzezinski argues, the Constitutional Tribunal
marked an important first step toward the institution of meaningful
judicial review in People's Poland. Its activities, he claims, "during
the final years of the communist era resulted in greater observance
of basic principles of good government and legal norms by organs
of the executive branch" (p. 77). Factual support for this claim is
thin. 10 1 And even if the Party/state did better observe principles of
good government and legal norms in the second half of the 1980s,
what was the basis for comparison? The immediately preceding period of martial law? The Gierek Administration of the 1970s?
Brzezinski is nevertheless correct in concluding that the Tribunal
"introduced into Polish political life the notion that governmental
authority derives legitimacy from its adherence to the rule of law"
(p. 77).
101. Brzezinski supports this claim by pointing to cases wherein the Tribunal limited
agency powers to those expressly delegated by statutes. P. 159. On the other hand, as he also

notes, of the 33 cases the Tribunal reviewed between 1986 and the fall of communism in 1989,
only three concerned the constitutionality of legislative enactments, and only one of those
was held "'partially inconsistent' with the Constitution. P. 158. It is also worth noting that
although the Constitutional Tribunal could pass judgment on the constitutionality of statutory enactments and administrative regulations, neither it nor any other court in the land had
the authority to require administrators to promulgate or enforce regulations under statutory

directives. See, e.g., CoLE, supra note 94, at 151 (describing how administrators could not be
sued for failing to promulgate or enforce environmental regulations). This would seem to be

a prerequisite to the observance of law and practice of good government. I think the most
that can accurately be said for the Constitutional Tribunal in the first stage of its existence

under communism is that it subjected, to some extent, the executive branch of government to
greater parliamentary control. Of course, this in itself was no mean feat.
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The 1982 Constitutional Amendments also authorized a new
Tribunal of State, "a quasi-judicial 'impeachment court"' designed
to hold state officials criminally responsible for official misconduct
(p. 77). Before the fall of communism, this organization proved to
be even less significant than the Constitutional Tribunal. As
Brzezinski explains (p. 78), its jurisdiction was limited; neither
members of Parliament nor party members who did not hold state
offices could be indicted for corruption. And when the Tribunal of
State indicted a former Prime Minister and other state officials in
1984, the Sejm passed a General Amnesty Law barring further proceedings. Thus, "the Tribunal of State did not contribute to any
substantial modification of communist political arrangements" (p.
78). Like the Constitutional Tribunal, however, this organization
has evolved in postcommunist Poland to provide an important
check on government abuse of power and corruption.
One more seed of liberal-democracy was sown before the end of
the communist era when, in 1987, the Sejm created the office of the
Ombudsman for Citizens' Rights, which Brzezinski calls "the first
independent position in the communist bloc designed to protect citizens from abuses of government power and violations of their constitutional rights by state officials" (p. 79). Although the
Ombudsman was created not by constitutional amendment but by
ordinary legislation, it was an immensely important development
for Polish constitutionalism. The Sejm gave the Ombudsman power
to receive citizens' complaints of human rights and constitutional
violations; to petition the Sejm for legislative remedies; to petition
the Constitutional Tribunal to review state actions that allegedly violate constitutional rights; and to bring criminal, civil, or administrative court actions on behalf of citizens or organizations (p. 79).
Together, the three new organizations instituted by constitutional amendment or legislation during the 1980s - the
Constitutional Tribunal, the Tribunal of State, and the Ombudsman
had great significance for communism in Poland. In particular,
they constituted tacit repudiation of certain of its fundamental tenets, including the conception of a communist state devoid of social
and political discord.' 0 2 On a more practical - that is, legal level, their significance in the Polish People's Republic was dubious.
Brzezinski focuses on the successes of the Constitutional Tribunal
and Ombudsman during the second half of the 1980s. He notes (p.
73) that "the Tribunal issued a number of important decisions addressing bureaucratic and executive branch arbitrariness." Meanwhile, Poland's first Ombudsman, the respected legal scholar Ewa
102. This was also reflected in other institutional changes in the 1980s, including the creation in 1980 of a High Administrative Court to adjudicate disputes between citizens and

administrative agencies. See pp. 139-40.

2092

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:2062

Letowska, "aggressively push[ed] for constitutional and political reforms," including Polish government acceptance of international
human rights standards (p. 80). She also "vigorously challenged unconstitutional state acts before the Constitutional Tribunal" (p. 80).
Brzezinski realizes, however, that these successes were necessarily

limited because the Constitutional Tribunal and Ombudsman were
inherently at odds with the political system in which they operated.
The Polish state was still very much a Party/state, with the PZPR
tightly grasping the reins of power. As Brzezinski concludes, "up to
1989 Party structures and not the constitution provided the key to
understanding politics and state policy-making in Poland" (p. 81).
The various constitutional and legal, not to mention economic,
reforms of the 1980s after the end of martial law signified the slow
demise of the communist system. They also, however, marked the
first steps of transition to a new, more liberal, and more democratic
political system. When the system changed in 1989, these and other
organizations and institutions that had been marginal at best under
communism became fundamental.
THE

EIGHT-YEAR STRUGGLE FOR A NEw CONSTITUTION IN

POSTCOMMUNIST POLAND

The best and biggest part of Brzezinski's book is his detailed
account of Poland's efforts after the fall of communism to establish
a constitutional order that, at once, respected Poland's legacy of
constitutionalism and recognized that old formulations are often
unsuited to modern problems of government. Poland's circumstances and constitutional ambitions at the end of the communist
era were obviously not the same as in 1791, 1921, or 1952. A new
Polish Republic required a new constitution - virtually everyone
agreed about that. On all other matters, however, from the structure of government to the nature (positive vs. negative) of constitutional rights, to the process for adopting a new constitution, there
was no consensus. Consequently, it took Poland eight years following the fall of communism to adopt a wholly new constitution.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, while western economists argued for the quickest possible privatization of economic activity
and the creation of market institutions, political scientists and sociologists urged the rapid development of institutions promoting civil
society, and liberal legal scholars promoted the immediate adoption
of new constitutions to organize state power around liberaldemocratic institutions. Yale Law School Professor Bruce
Ackerman argued forcefully for the primacy of constitution writing:
Neither the privatization of the economy nor the construction of civil
society should preoccupy revolutionaries first and foremost. However much liberals may want to think about such things, the organiza-
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tion of state power deserves immediate concern. The window of
opportunity for constitutionalizing liberal revolution is open for a
shorter time than is generally recognized. Unless the constitutional
moment is seized to advantage, it may be missed entirely. In contrast,
constructing a liberal market economy, let alone a civil society, requires decades, perhaps generations, and the project can easily be undermined without the10timely
adoption of an appropriate
3
constitutional framework.
Accepting, for the sake of argument, Ackerman's claim of the primary importance of constitutionalizing a framework within which
market institutions and civil society can develop, the question remains: Precisely how long does the window of opportunity remain
open? Ackerman says it remains open only for a short time. How
short? Two years? Five years? Ten? It took the American
revolutionaries/framers five years following the end of the
Revolutionary War to adopt a viable constitutional framework for
national government. 10 4 Postcommunist Poland took eight years.
In both cases, it was far from an easy process.
Brzezinski tells the story of Poland's "democratic rebirth and
constitutional reform," relating in detail the various political machinations, false starts, and crises of legitimation that dogged the process. This is the most valuable part of his book because much of the
story has not been told before. And it is a story Brzezinski knows
and tells well. He lived in Warsaw from 1991 to 1995 as a Fulbright
Scholar and Soros Lecturer, and, as one reviewer explains,
Brzezinski "was a friend to and an intellectual resource for many of
the writers of the new Polish constitution." 10 5 His book vividly portrays the political travails of constitution writing, illustrating an old
adage that it is easier for disparate parties to unite against a common foe than for a common good. As various Solidarity-based governments in postcommunist Poland discovered, it was far easier to
fight together against communism than to rule.
Under the circumstances, the remarkable thing is not that it
took Poland eight years to adopt a new constitution but that it took
Poland only eight years to adopt a new constitution. In those eight
years, Poland had three different parliaments and, depending on
how one counts, at least six different governments. At its smallest,
103. BRUCE AcKiRMAN,THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL REVOLUTION 46-47 (1992).
104. They began with a protoconstitution, the Articles of Confederation, in 1787 (ratified
in 1781). This scheme, however, created a national government so weak as to be unviable. In
a sense, America under the Articles of Confederation was like Poland under the "Small Constitution" adopted in 1989. In both cases, they were temporary documents needed to buy
time for the slower process of developing a more permanent framework for government.
And, as Ackerman puts it, the American Articles of Confederation "led to a pervasive political malaise comparable to the feeling in Poland today." Id. at 56.
105. Frederick Quinn, From Communism to Constitutionalism,CoNN.L. TRIB., Apr. 6,
1998, at 25 (reviewing The Struggle for Constitutionalismin Poland).
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the Seim included six different political parties, ranging from the
postcommunist SLD and social-democratic UP to the proreform,
probusiness UW and the ultranationalist KPN; at its largest, it contained twenty-nine parties that represented an even broader spectrum of (often radical) interests (pp. 91-93). That such disparate
parties could ever come to agree on a single constitutional draft is
remarkable in itself. To some extent, they made their own task easier by taking their time and going about constitution drafting in a
piecemeal fashion. Poland's 1952 Constitution underwent three
sets of major amendments after 1989 before it was completely replaced in 1997. Many of the interim changes foreshadowed the new
constitutional framework that emerged in 1997.
As Brzezinski explains (pp. 110-11), constitutional amendments
of April and December 1989 and the "Small Constitution" of 1992
effectively converted Poland from a communist totalitarian system
to a constitutional Rechtstaat. Among other things, the April 1989
Amendments freed the judicial branch of government from political
(i.e., Party) control. They didn't just promise judicial independence
-

the 1952 Constitution did that

-

but ensured it by giving

Supreme Court justices life tenure and "precluding direct contacts
between political officials and members of the judiciary" (p. 85).
The state's prosecutors' offices were finally divorced from the
courts. In this and other ways, Brzezinski concludes, the April 1989
Amendments "contributed to the restoration of basic elements of
the doctrine of separation of powers" and a system of checks and
balances (p. 86). They "signified the demise of the Soviet-style governmental system of entirely centralized state authority" (p. 86).
Between the April 1989 and December 1989 Constitutional
Amendments, a great deal changed in Poland. In June the Communists were swept aside in (semi-) free elections, and Solidarity
gained an "effective majority" in the new Parliament, though sixtyfive percent of the seats in the lower house, the Sejm, were held by
PZPR-backed candidates. By September a Solidarity activist,
Tadeusz Mazowiecki, had become Poland's first noncommunist
Prime Minister in more than half a century. Communism in Poland
was disintegrating much faster than anyone had dared imagine. As
a consequence, the April 1989 Amendments to the 1952 Constitution were already obsolete. A brand new constitution was needed
to reflect the new political realities in Poland. In recognition that
this would take some time, the Sejm enacted another round of interim amendments to the 1952 Constitution.
The December 1989 Amendments obliterated virtually all remnants of communism from the Constitution. As Brzezinski
explains:
The December Amendments deleted the Constitution's preamble and
its first two chapters on the political and socioeconomic system of the
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Polish People's Republic. They also eliminated the anachronistic

clause declaring the Party's 'leading role', expunged the reference to
Poland's alliance with the Soviet Union, deleted the clause describing

Poland's economy as based on 'socialized means of production' and
introduced the principle of the equality of diverse forms of ownership,

thus providing a constitutional 10foundation
for private property and
6
the emerging market economy.

The December Amendments also changed the country's name from
the Polish People's Republic to the Republic of Poland. Most importantly, Article One proclaimed Poland "'a democratic state
ruled by law, implementing principles of social justice."' 10 7 As
Brzezinski notes, this provision evoked the Rechtstaat principle of
(West) German constitutional law (p. 88).
After 1989, Poland was no longer a communist country. Its constitutional framework was far closer to those of liberal-democratic
countries than to the Soviet Union's. Its economy was no longer
socialist. Even before the Mazowiecki government introduced the
so-called "shock therapy" package of economic reforms in January
1990, socialism had ended with the introduction of the Law on Economic Activities in January 1989.108 That law freed most sectors of

the economy from centralized planning and resource allocation.
Poland's transition to market democracy was underway.
Still, no one believed that the task of constitutional revision was
anywhere near complete. As Brzezinski notes, "[d]espite the substantial changes, the 1952 Constitution as amended was never intended by those on the forefront of Poland's political renewal to be
the nation's final constitutional structure" (p. 89). The April and
December 1989 Constitutional Amendments were stop-gap measures intended primarily to buy time for a more thorough constitutional rewrite.
In the interim, Poland went through something of a constitutional crisis. In 1992, the government of Prime Minister Janusz
Olszewski continually challenged then President Lech Walesa's
constitutional prerogatives, particularly in the realm of national defense. Brzezinski refers to a 1992 public opinion poll in which "65
per cent of respondents expressed dissatisfaction with the 'political
chaos"' (p. 96). Further constitutional amendments were needed to
delineate more clearly the balance of powers between president,
106. P. 88. The December 1989 Amendments are codified at 1989 Dz. U. No. 75, item

444.
107. P. 88 (quoting PoLsKiE KoNs'u-ocm (Dec. 1989 constitutional amendments) art.
1). This provision was later engrafted into Article 2 of Poland's 1997 Constitution, which

finally replaced completely the 1952 Constitution (as amended). See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
108. See 1988 Dz. U. No. 41, item 324. For a more detailed discussion of this law and its
consequences, see CoLE, supra note 94, at 183-84.
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government, and parliament. In February 1992, the Sejm established a Constitutional Committee to draft a replacement for the
1952 Constitution. Before it could begin drafting a wholly new constitution, however, the Committee had to deal with the immediate
political/constitutional crisis. It did so by enacting the "Small
Constitution" of 1992.
From the start, the Small Constitution was viewed as "a 'provisional measure' until a full constitution could be agreed upon" (p.
98). It was intended to resolve the existing "political paralysis"
caused by disputes between President and Parliament by providing
"a formula for productive cooperation and equilibrium among the
three top state authorities" (p. 98). The Small Constitution
"eliminat[ed] ... the Sejm's former status as the 'highest institution

of state authority,"' and created a more balanced power structure
between the presidency, the government, and the parliament (p.
99). Thus, Brzezinski concludes, the Small Constitution represented "a compromise between presidential and parliamentary systems of government" (p. 98).

What made the Small Constitution a "provisional measure"
rather than a complete replacement for the 1952 Constitution was
its exclusive focus on the state power structure. No attention was
paid to constitutional rights and liberties. Provisions of the 1952
Constitution (as amended in 1976) concerning civil and religious
rights were left unchanged. President Wal~sa attempted to resolve
this problem and, for all practical purposes, complete the task of
constitutional reform in November 1992, when he introduced into
Parliament his "Charter of Rights and Freedoms," which would
have become part of the Small Constitution in much the same way
that the Bill of Rights became part of the previously adopted
American Constitution. Walqsa's proposal took everyone by surprise, especially those who suspected him of harboring dictatorial
ambitions.10 9 The Charter seemed to contradict his political image:
the populist conservative who fancied himself another Pilsudski had
suddenly become Poland's "leading representative of social
liberalism."110
Walesa's proposed Charter contained "twenty-two basic civil
and political rights common to all liberal democracies," including
109. Wal9sa himself fueled these suspicions. He often pointed out that Marshal Pilsudski
was his personal hero; he recreated Pilsudski's political party, the BBWR, in an effort to
consolidate his political base; and he averred on several occasions that he would protect
Poland should the ex-communists attempt to retake power, even by democratic means. On
the relationship between WValqsa and Pilsudski, see, for example, Neal Ascherson, The Great
Electrician is Playing a Game with Poland's Faith in Democracy, Tm INDEPENDENT
(LONDON), Feb. 12, 1995, at 22; Roger Boyes, Walesa Draws Strength From Dictator Idol,
Tim ThIEs, Feb. 9, 1995, at 14; Adam Michnik, The Worship of Walesa, THE GUARDIAN
(LONDON), June 25, 1993, at 15.
110. Dawid Warszawski, Belvedere Charter,POLISH NEws BULL., Dec. 8, 1992.
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freedom of religion, the right to privacy, and freedom from government censorship. 1 1 It also included a "catalogue of wishes, in particular those with which every social liberal identifies, but rather
unfeasible and difficult to materialise. '"1 2 These "'economic, social
and cultural targets"' were not rights; citizens could not bring suit
responsible for
in court to enforce them, but the government was 113
abilities."
economic
to
"'according
them
attaining
Walqsa's proposed Charter of Rights and Liberties received a
warm welcome in Parliament, but it never became part of Poland's
constitutional law. Before it could be enacted Walqsa dissolved the
Seim (for unrelated reasons) and called for new elections. After
those elections Walqsa resubmitted the Charter as part of a larger
draft constitution. It was referred to the Constitutional Committee,
where it languished, vying for attention with six other draft constitutions, for the next three years.
In the meantime, Brzezinski suggests, the need for a complete
constitutional rewrite became less pressing because "the hybrid
framework created by the April and December Amendments and
by the Small Constitution provided the groundwork for a modem
Polish polity as well as institutional stability during a period of extraordinary politics" (p. 129). Some of that institutional stability
came from organizations that predated the fall of communism in
Poland, in particular the Ombudsman and the Constitutional
Tribunal.
Brzezinski demonstrates in Chapter Six of his book how the
Tribunal, after 1989, "assumed an active role in constitutional matters, instilling normative characteristics into Polish constitutionalism and developing constitutional doctrine in accordance with its
understanding of the suprapositive principles of a state ruled by
law" (p. 158). In spite of substantive limitations on its jurisdiction
that carried over into the early 1990s, the Tribunal established independent judicial review as a fundamental trait of Polish constitutionalism. Several of its decisions in the early 1990s enforced
constitutional provisions against nonconforming statutes, thereby
reinforcing the Rechtstaat clause of the Constitution. The Tribunal
also supported the separation of powers by preventing the Sejm
from delegating to the President the power to remove regular court
judges for political reasons. As Brzezinski suggests, the Tribunal's
assertion of autonomy and its active defense of the Constitution as
111. P. 107. For a complete English translation of the Draft Charter of Rights and Freedoms see 1996 ST. Louis - WARSAW
112. Warszawski, supra note 110.

TRANSATLANTC L.J. 73.

113. See id. For more on the Draft Charter, see Stanislaw Frankowski, Lech Wafgsa's
Draft of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms: An Overview, 1996 ST. Louis - WARSAW
TRANSATLArrIc

LJ.65.
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the highest law of the land "symbolized Poland's transition out of
the Soviet-style governmental system of entirely centralized state
power to a system of separated powers" (p. 163). Still, the Tribunal
was not the final arbiter of Poland's Constitution; a majority of the
Sejm still could overrule its decisions. For that and other reasons especially the need for a new "bill of rights" - additional constitutional reforms remained necessary.
Brzezinski comprehensively canvasses the political problems
that plagued Poland's efforts to adopt a completely new constitution in the years following the enactment of the Small Constitution.
There were questions of process as well as substance. Some questioned whether the Sejm's Constitutional Committee was a legitimate body to draft a constitution even though it did not represent
the political viewpoints of all Poles.114 But ultimately, in June 1996,
the Constitutional Commission presented a completely new draft
constitution for parliamentary approval. The National Assembly
approved it on April 2, 1997. Six weeks later, it was ratified in a
public referendum by a majority of Poles who cast ballots. It entered into force on October 17, 1997.
POLAND'S NEW CONSTITUTION

Brzezinski writes little about Poland's 1997 Constitution, which
became effective just a few months before his book was published.
He provides only a short overview of its main features, including its
parliamentary system of government, presidential prerogatives in
foreign affairs, the process for enacting constitutional amendments,
and its civil rights provisions." 5 This is unfortunate because the
114. This question plagued constitution-writing efforts not only in the "Round Table
Seim" elected in 1989 but also in the Seim elected in 1993. The "Round Table Seim" lacked
legitimacy because it was not elected freely; the electoral rules of the "Round Table Accords"
reserved 65 percent of the seats in the lower house of Parliament for (ex-)Communist Party
members. See p. 83. The next round of parliamentary elections in 1991 solved this problem
but resulted in a Sejm comprised of 29 parties, which were able to agree on almost nothing
because of political and ideological divides. See pp. 91-93. As Brzezinski notes, p. 104, this
did not prevent the 1991 Sejm from completing important legislative tasks, including the
Small Constitution and new electoral criteria that would likely prevent such a fractured Se/m
in the future by limiting entry to those parties that received 5 percent or more of the popular
vote (8 percent was required for coalitions of parties). In the subsequent parliamentary elections of 1993, only 6 parties managed to cross the 5 (or 8) percent threshold for entry into
Parliament. Thus, the new electoral criterion had achieved its purpose: fewer parties were
represented in the Sejm, which did not necessarily mean the Sejm was less fragmented or
more productive. Indeed, in at least one respect, the 5 (or 8) percent rule made the new Sejrn
less productive: the work of its Constitutional Committee was slowed by questions of legitimacy because so many parties were excluded from its deliberations. See pp. 112-18.
115. See pp. 123-27. The 1997 Constitution is codified at 1997 Dz. U. No. 78, item 483.
For an official English-language version of the 1997 Constitution, see POL. CONST. (1997)
reprinted in 1997 ST. Louis - WARSAw TRANSATLAn.c L.J. 5 [hereinafter POL. CONST.

(1997)].
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termination. Thus, the constitutional right to be free from cruel
treatment and punishment (from Article 40) is self-executing and
directly applicable against state authorities, but the constitutional
right to social security (from Article 67) is subject to the following
proviso: "The scope and forms of social security shall be specified
by statute."1 31 Similarly, the state's actual obligations with respect
to the "right to education" (contained in Article 70) "shall be speci32
fied by statute.'
Some of the drafters' decisions in categorizing rights as directly
enforceable or requiring implementing legislation are questionable.' 33 Most importantly, however, the Constitution makes clear to
citizens what to expect with respect to each civil and social right.
This reduces the risk that the legal force of all constitutional rights
might be reduced by the combination of (more difficult to enforce)
"positive" rights and (more easily enforced and possibly more important) "negative" rights. Poland's significant innovation in constitution writing, if it proves successful in implementation, should
34
influence how other countries draft constitutional rights.'
CONCLUSION

Mark Brzezinski's analysis of Polish constitutional history in
The Struggles for Constitutionalism in Poland serves a number of
valuable purposes. On the most basic level, it expands our knowledge of an important aspect of one of the most important historical
events of the twentieth century: how Poland managed to rebuild
constitutional government after more than four decades of communist totalitarianism. And it does so in a nuanced way. It was not a
simple story of casting off communist shackles and "starting from
scratch" in designing constitutional institutions. There was a great
deal of historical and institutional baggage, some of which has
proved quite useful in postcommunist Poland. Indeed, Poland's
constitutional history demonstrates the culturally and historically
contingent nature of constitution making.
Brzezinski's historical analysis also adds, though less than it
might have, to our understanding of Poland's longer constitutional
history, something about which Americans and West Europeans are
woefully ignorant. This ignorance is unfortunate because, as I hope
to have shown in this review essay, Poland's history of constitutionalism has, overall, been quite innovative and interesting, decidedly
western in its orientation, and sometimes internationally influential.
131. Id., art. 67, at 17.
132. Id., art. 70.
133. For some examples, see Cole, supra note 24.
134. Many other features of Poland's 1997 Constitution are worth discussing. I address
several of them in id.
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A better understanding of Polish legal and constitutional history
might lead us to a different conception of Eastern Europe's largest
country and its proper place in European history.

